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ABSTRACT: The mythology surrounding atomic power, which makes reference to its 
omnipotent energy or devastating catastrophic fire, has, since the 1950s fed the collective 
imagination and public debate in nuclearised societies. Although it can be assumed these debates 
have little in common with the operational realities of managers, the recent accident at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant has shown that in many countries the debate on the withdrawal 
of nuclear power may lead to political decisions that have an impact on the entire population. 
The decommissioning of many operational plants (whether because nuclear power is being 
withdrawn, or because plants have become obsolete) has had an impact on the representations 
shared by actors in these organizations. 
Decommissioning operations have the effect of creating a tension between ideas of 
“deconstruction” and those of production. In this special phase of the plant’s life cycle, 
interactions between actors play a key role in the construction of a shared system of 
representations, which is based on both a new organizational culture and a shared safety culture. 
These shared representations are at the origin of a cognitive consensus that must facilitate action 
and decision-making within organizations.  
This article is a historical study of representations of nuclear energy in France from the post-war 
period to the modern day. It first highlights the strength of myths and representations found in 
the design and construction phases of nuclear technology. The second part of this article shows 
how myths and representations affect decisions that are taken during the decommissioning of 
facilities. Finally, the third part of this analysis describes the consequences of these systems of 
representation on the morale of actors involved in decommissioning and the construction of a 
shared decommissioning culture.  
  
  
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The concept of the imaginaire (the imaginary) can be defined as, “a set of 
productions, mental or physically materialized, based on language and visual images, 
forming coherent and dynamic wholes, which have a symbolic function in the sense 
of a nesting of strict and figurative senses” (Wunenburger, 2003). The public debate 
on nuclear energy is fed by a collective imaginaire consisting of a very heterogeneous 
set of representations. This set of mental constructions corresponds to the creation of 
an image of civilian and military nuclear energy that is based on a layering of 
symbols, narratives and metaphors, which build up over long periods of time.  
The creation of these systems of representation depends on a series of factors that 
influence the cognitive schemas of contemporary societies. First, the transition to 
modernity is characterized by a loss of confidence in technology and expertise. This 
crisis is reinforced by a lack of transparency in decision-making observed by the 
general population. Second, the intensification of the means of production, the urban 
concentration of populations, the increasing prevalence of consumerist models of 
society and the acceleration of trade have reduced risks; in particular industrial risks, 
which do not seem to respect geographic, temporal or social boundaries (Beck, 2011). 
The third factor is related to the others: the loss of confidence and the globalization of 
risk amplify feelings of vulnerability. This sentiment increases the need of individuals 
to feel safe. The effect is all the more evident as individual’s become increasingly 
insecure due to the hyper-mediatisation of technological accidents, which have 
become key vectors in the creation of the social imaginaire (Le Breton, 2012). This 
has a major impact on the perception of nuclear risk and the design of energy and 
industrial policies. The ensuing debates are therefore not far from the operational 
realities of managers, as demonstrated by the strategic impact of the accident which 
occurred at Fukushima, both in terms of electronuclear power generation and the 
decommissioning of facilities.  
The article therefore looks at myths and representations in French nuclear history, 
from the post-war period to the present day. Ultimately, the aim is to measure the 
impact of these images on the safety of contemporary decommissioning operations. 
The first part of the analysis thus determines the influence of representations during 
the construction phases of nuclear technology. The second part demonstrates the role 
they play in decisions to decommission sites, while the third shows their degree of 
influence on the morale of actors involved in decommissioning and the construction 
of a shared organizational and safety culture.  
2. REPRESENTATIONS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN FRANCE  
First of all we will show the influence of representations on the process of nuclear 
technology construction in France. Many historical studies have already been made of 
how civilian nuclear energy has been developed in France, the interpretation of which 
could drive public debate. Two studies seem particularly relevant: Le rayonnement de 
la France [The influence of France] (Hecht, 2004), which examines the intertwined 
history of the nuclear programme, technology and France from the 1950s to the late 
1960s; and L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome [Dissenting action put to the 
test by nuclear energy] (Topçu, 2010), which explores the evolution of opposition to 
nuclear energy and “government of the criticism” from 1968 to 2008.  
2.1 Technology as a symbol of power  
In 1944, France had been deeply wounded: the memory of defeat and the Occupation 
had permanently marked the national consciousness; human losses were very high, 
any industry that had escaped destruction during the war was likely to be obsolete; the 
economy was paralyzed and rationing was still in force.  
To overcome the technological lag of the country, the provisional government decided 
to establish the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in October 1945 in order to 
develop applications for nuclear energy. The initiative clearly highlighted the key 
challenge of nuclear energy. Consequently, superior technical performance, embodied 
in the nuclear development programme was presented by experts as the solution to the 
country’s decline (Hecht, 2004).  
The first nuclear reaction, carried out by CEA physicists in December 1948, 
confirmed the gradual recovery of France. Another important step forward was taken 
in July 1952, when the government voted in favour of the Gaillard Plan, which 
provided the CEA with the necessary funding for the construction of the French-
designed Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz (UNGG or gas-cooled) reactors. 
The G1 (1956–1968), G2 (1958–1980) and G3 (1959–1984) reactors were developed 
at Marcoule in southern France. These UNGG prototypes illustrated the technological 
and industrial success of the country. “With these three nuclear power plants, France 
begins electricity generation from nuclear power and takes her place among the major 
nuclear nations alongside the United States, the USSR and England. Marcoule is the 
name of atomic energy in France”, (French news, 1955). The press and local 
authorities compared the site to a cathedral, able to compete with the most prestigious 
monuments in Paris and the region was expected contribute to the enrichment, even 
the renewal, of the nation’s heritage. Meanwhile, the electricity company Électricité 
de France (EDF), which was formed following the nationalization of electricity and 
gas companies in April 1946, built the EDF1 reactor at Chinon (1963–1973), followed 
by EDF2 (1965–1985) and EDF3 (1966–1990). This time it was not religious imagery 
that was invoked, rather that of the modern castle.  
Following the founding of the French Fifth Republic in 1958, Charles de Gaulle 
placed great emphasis on the nuclear programme. Although the number of facilities 
increased during his two presidential terms, the period is mostly remembered for 
images of the explosion of the first French atomic bomb in February 1960. The 
country now had a deterrent strike force, whose technological power boosted the 
nation’s image.  
The development of nuclear energy did not generate much public debate in France in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Opponents focused more on the dangers of nuclear weapons, 
although protests never reached the intensity of the international movement for 
nuclear disarmament. Only a few, isolated voices spoke out against nuclear power 
plants, the production of radioactive waste or the risk of accident.  
From 1967–1968 the Consultative Committee for the Production of Nuclear 
Electricity studied various alternative nuclear programmes and recommended the 
adoption of the American system of pressurised water reactors (PWR), which were 
more profitable than the UNGG-type reactors. EDF supported the recommendation, 
while the CEA wanted to maintain the French system. In 1969, social unrest (which 
had had an impact on the CEA) intensified following the announcement by President 
Pompidou on 14 November 1969 of the end of the UNGG programme. On 17 
November, 4,000–6,000 demonstrators marched in Paris in support of the French 
system. But the government’s decision was final. The “war of the systems” ended at 
the same time as the civil unrest. From this point on, national independence would no 
longer be guaranteed by a particular technology, but by the ability of the French 
programme to prove itself and promote the virtues of atomic energy at the 
international level.  
2.2 The image of atomic energy: from the Messmer Plan to the Fukushima accident 
In March 1974, French Prime Minister Messmer announced an increase in 
electronuclear power programmes and plans to build 13 nuclear power plants in two 
years. The political class supported the nuclearisation of the country and it attracted 
little attention during the 1974 presidential campaign. The programme was given new 
impetus by President Giscard d’Estaing and his government.  
It was at this time that opposition in civil society started to crystallize. The anti-
nuclear movement developed in France in the early 1970s from the environmental 
movement – which in turn found it origins in the events of May 1968 that saw 
unprecedented civil unrest in France. Activists equated nuclear power to “a big tool 
for the radical transformation of society, to turn it into a technological, centralized and 
authoritarian model, towards a society based on consumption and waste” (Topçu, 
2010). Militant actions took various forms: sites were occupied, petitions were signed, 
documents were drawn up, alerts were launched, etc.  
The antinuclear movement intensified its activities following the presentation of the 
Messmer Plan. The sites chosen for the construction of nuclear power plants received 
the most criticism. Superphénix (a reactor located near Lyon, in south-east France), in 
particular, became a powerful symbol of the struggle. The confrontation in July 1977 
between around 20,000 protesters and police escalated and ended in one death and 
hundreds of injuries. The rejection of the “nucleocracy”, authoritarianism and 
capitalism, embodied by the Messmer Plan remained major issues for the movement, 
which also concerned itself with environmental protection and health risks. However, 
this diversity in their targets prevented activists from presenting a united front and 
hampered their efforts. Opponents included a wide variety of actors, such as the 
physicists making up the Association of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy, 
economists at the Institute of Legal and Economic Studies at Grenoble, and the 
French Democratic Confederation of Labour (a major trade union confederation) 
which provided the group with more resources and enhanced its ability to present 
counter-arguments and provide information about the movement. Nevertheless, in the 
mid-1970s the majority of the French population still remained in favour of civilian 
nuclear energy.  
The increase in opposition led EDF to organize an extensive information campaign to 
reassure the public. The lack of impact on French public opinion of the accident at 
Three Mile Island (March 1979) showed the effectiveness of the pro-nuclear 
campaign, and the gradual erosion of the protest movement.  
The Chernobyl disaster (April 1986) brought a very different perspective and deeply 
transformed the image of nuclear energy. In France, a “policy of secrecy” – deeply 
embedded in the culture of decision-making in the nuclear sector – concerning the 
impact of the radioactive cloud, was followed by the Central Service for Protection 
against Ionising Radiation, the government, the administration and local authorities, 
accompanied by silence from the scientific community and the press. The few 
dissenting voices were marginal and largely unheard. Following the disaster, although 
anti-nuclear protests remained rare and the majority of the population continued to 
support civilian nuclear energy, there was a change in strategy. Two independent 
laboratories for countermeasure-expertise – the Independent Commission for 
Research and Information on Radioactivity; and the Association for the Control of 
Radioactivity in the West – were established and the number of alerts increased. 
Rather than reject nuclear technology, from now on it would be monitored.  
Actors in the nuclear domain changed their communication strategy with the aim of 
changing the harmful image of nuclear energy. In the second half of the 1980s they 
began a debate on the “desacrilisation” and “popularisation” of the nuclear industry. 
Efforts were also made to make the nuclear industry more transparent and democratic. 
In response to their critics, they developed the image of the “green atom”. For 
example in the 1990s EDF advertising created a link between nuclear power and 
environmental conservation. This debated dominated the public sphere, as a result of 
resources that far exceeded those of anti-nuclear activists. Even the emergence of new 
communities, such as the Nuclear Exit Network that was fundamentally opposed to 
the representation of atomic energy as “democratic” or “green” failed to revive the 
intense opposition of the 1970s.  
Nevertheless, the public debate was revived by the accident at Fukushima Daiichi 
(March 2011). The press gave the event urgent and symbolic importance, hailing it as 
the beginning of a new era of nuclear catastrophes in the new millennium. Articles 
announced the end of the myth of “Soviet carelessness” and the “failure of techno-
science” (Foucart, 2011; Géal, 2011). Other authors denounced “techogenic pride” 
(Goanec, 2011), and the “hubris” of the Japanese archipelago (McCormack, 2011). 
The accident was frequently associated with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
Reactions were different in other European countries: Germany programmed the 
closure of its nuclear reactors by 2022, and Switzerland in 2034. In France, two weeks 
after the accident, 56% of the French population expressed concern with regard to 
nuclear power; by March 2013, the level had dropped to 42% (Agence France-Presse, 
2013). The Fillon government refused to close down the nuclear industry, which it 
claimed was the guarantor of national energy independence. EDF announced the 
creation of a rapid reaction force in case of an accident. Stress tests were conducted 
on European nuclear power plants at the request of the European Council.  
In May 2012, François Hollande’s general election victory against Nicolas Sarkozy 
resulted in significant changes in French energy policy. In accordance with the new 
government’s socialist programme, the president wanted to phase out the country’s 
dependence on nuclear energy through the creation of huge energy savings and the 
development of renewable energy. A statement from the President’s Office in 
September 2012 confirmed the imminent closure of the Fessenheim nuclear power 
plant in north-eastern France. This not only pleased environmentalists, but also 
restated the major decommissioning challenges faced by the French nuclear industry.  
The design of nuclear technology in France has generated representations which have 
in turn influenced the strategies of actors in the nuclear sector. Debates have been 
driven by the decisions of policy-makers, the impact of crises and changes in risk 
perception. On this latter point differing images of the industry, which are arbitrated 
by both proponents and opponents of nuclear power have influenced not only how 
production is organised, but also how sites are deconstructed; these two phases are 
historically inseparable.  
3. THE INFLUENCE OF REPRESENTATIONS ON DECOMMISSIONING 
POLICY 
The second part of this article shows how decommissioning policies form part of the 
history of representations of the nuclear industry. The Institute of Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety defines this process as, “the set of operations to remove 
the constituent components of a decommissioned nuclear facility” 
(http://www.irsn.fr/). The first such operations were undertaken in France in the early 
1960s. Research laboratories, experimental reactors and fuel cycle facilities were 
dismantled in the 1960s and 1970s. The dismantling of several powerful reactors 
began in the 1980s. But it was not until the late 1990s that decommissioning 
operations entered an industrial phase. In France, over thirty nuclear facilities (such as 
first-generation EDF reactors, Superphénix, the CEA reactor at Fontenay-aux-Roses, 
the Strasbourg University reactor, reprocessing plants at The Hague, etc.) are 
currently in the final phases of shutdown and decommissioning.  
3.1 The mirror effect of decommissioning  
“Like all industrial facilities, nuclear facilities, at the end of their period of operation, 
will be dismantled”, (see http://www.asn.fr/). This statement from the Nuclear Safety 
Authority (L’Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, ASN) clearly places this type of operation 
in a context that corresponds to the “popularised” image that actors in the nuclear 
industry sought to give to nuclear energy following the Chernobyl accident. 
Consequently, decommissioning is implicitly defined as the “normal” end point of a 
“normal” system.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency identifies three strategies for the 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities: deferred dismantling, safe containment and 
immediate dismantling. The latter strategy, which is recommended by the ASN, 
involves decommissioning the site when operations end, without waiting for the 
reduction of radiation levels.  
The ASN argues that the immediate dismantling strategy is preferable because it 
reduces problems related to radioactive waste management for future generations. 
Moreover, the ASN argues, operators benefit from systems that can manage the 
majority of waste resulting from decommissioning. Operators too, have gained 
considerable experience as a result of actions that have been carried out since the 
1980s. This know-how enables them to better manage not only the technical aspects 
of decommissioning, but also the environmental and health risks associated with it. 
Moreover, this strategy advocated by the ASN overcomes certain problems created by 
deferred dismantling, such as loss of expertise gained during the operational phase of 
the facility. Consequently, the ASN argues that in France, all of the conditions for 
immediate dismantling are met and its technical feasibility is guaranteed.  
The regulatory framework places many demands on operators, who must carry out an 
assessment of the cost of operations and hold sufficient funds to meet their financial 
needs (Act no. 2006-739, 28 June 2006). They must also communicate regularly with 
public agencies and keep the general public informed. This legal and technical 
requirement appears to be consistent with the rhetoric that describes nuclear energy as 
“green”, “reliable” and “transparent”, advanced by actors in the nuclear industry.  
This “mirror effect” characterizes not only factors related to immediate 
decommissioning, but also the various issues implied by this strategy. 
Decommissioning is seen as a growing market since the Fukushima accident. The 
economic component is all the more important as many ageing European reactors will 
soon be taken out of service (Garric, 2012). It was in this spirit that French President 
François Hollande announced the closure of the Fessenheim nuclear power station, in 
order to provide, “an example of successful decommissioning, so that nuclear power 
stations that are about to reach the end of their lives in many countries of the world 
and which require technological expertise, may once more provide an opportunity for 
the French nuclear industry” (Barjonet, 2012). France must therefore quickly make a 
name for itself against foreign competition, “Whoever dismantles the first units will 
be best placed to take care of all the others” (L’Usine Nouvelle, 2012).  
Moreover, it is not only the ability of the nuclear industry to generate profits that is at 
stake, but also the image of France. The success of site decommissioning and the 
export of French expertise strengthen the soft power of the country, through a 
demonstration of technical expertise in the system as a whole. The technical argument 
is, however, irrelevant if we do not pay attention to the environmental impact of the 
final goal of immediate decommissioning. Phrases such as “back to grass”, “return to 
the meadow”, or “the green stadium” are a good illustration of the desire of policy-
makers to prove the “green” and “sustainable” dimension of civilian nuclear energy; 
the gauge of legitimacy from the point of view of current environmental imperatives.  
3.2 Decommissioning: the last myth of nuclear power?  
Decisions and activities related to decommissioning have led to a certain amount of 
criticism, which feeds the poor public image of the nuclear industry. Economic and 
financial uncertainties related to decommissioning of sites are regularly reported by 
the press: the validity of EDF, Areva and CEA estimates compared to the true cost of 
decommissioning, concerns expressed by the Court of Auditors about the level of 
provisions for operators; the relativisation of announced profits; uncertainties 
regarding jobs following the shutdown of a facility, etc. The issue of cost estimates 
demonstrates the deep mistrust of the antinuclear movement towards 
decommissioning. For example, Greenpeace France believes that the Court of 
Auditors has clearly underestimated figures in its report of January 2012 (Garric, 
2012).  
The lack of transparency is another leitmotif that runs through the public debate. This 
deficiency, an integral component of French nuclear history, discriminates against 
decommissioning activities because in addition to promoting democracy, transparency 
encourages the development of “credible and readily understandable solutions” 
(Lecomte, 2011). Opaque decommissioning procedures became a prime target for the 
Réseau Sortir du nucléaire (the Nuclear Exit Network). In February 2010, the group 
launched a petition, signed by more than 20,000 people, calling for genuine public 
debate on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the future of radioactive 
waste. They demanded that these consultations should mark a break with previous 
debates that were deemed to be “bogus”, in order that decommissioning was carried 
out with respect for the needs of workers, residents, the environment and democracy 
(Réseau Sortir du nucléaire, 2010).  
Dismantling a nuclear power plant creates a significant amount of radioactive 
products: residual fissile materials, fission products, gas filters, activated metal 
structures, cleaning fluids, etc. (Bonnaure, 2011). In a magazine interview, Christine 
Bergé argued that the management of these products highlights the myth of nuclear 
decommissioning and a return to nature: “It might be dismantled but it doesn’t 
actually resolve the problem of radioactivity. A nuclear power plant is really a giant 
rubbish bin whose contents are scattered about” (Laurent, 2011). The denunciation of 
this myth challenges prevailing ideas of managed decommissioning and the 
sustainable “green” atom.  
Representations of decommissioning bring to light both the powerful relations at work 
in the public debate and the strategic challenges for the nuclear industry. These 
representations shed light on the relationship that existing companies may have with 
technology and its uses, and make it possible to situate, in ongoing decommissioning 
operations, the debates and myths that make up the history of civilian nuclear energy. 
It is on the basis of this dual temporality and the various discursive registers that 
representations become organized into systems that can improve the morale of actors 
and create a shared decommissioning culture.  
4. THE IMPACT OF REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS ON THE MORALE OF 
ACTORS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHARED DECOMISSIONING 
CULTURE 
This last part of the article describes the impact of the public debate on the actors 
involved in decommissioning. It considers on the one hand the effects of 
decommissioning on the organization of the facility in question, and on the other 
hand, the positive and negative effects of societal representations on the employees 
responsible for this final period of the life cycle of nuclear power plants.  
4.1 Decommissioning: reorganization of working groups and social networks  
Decommissioning is often the result of a sudden political decision and this final phase 
of the life of the nuclear power plant is marked by a profound reorganization of 
working groups. First, the plant’s organogram is modified to meet the objectives of 
decommissioning (Pelleterat de Borde et al., 2013). This modification must provide 
the skills needed for decommissioning, but it must also establish the various end-
points of the departments in charge of the decommissioning. The maintenance 
department must provide services to the decommissioning project team while at the 
same time responding to requests from the operations department for the maintenance 
of the reactor. As for the operations department, it must ensure the safety and 
operation of the reactor for the purpose of decommissioning. However, asking 
employees – who had previously been expected to produce and give a positive image 
of their profession – to deconstruct the tool of their trade requires them to take 
ownership of words and thoughts that are able to maintain collective morale in a 
virtuous circle for the safety of the operation (Martin & Guarnieri, 2013).  
However, representations found in the public debate weigh on the professional culture 
of employees. The decision to decommission, when it is politically and historically 
motivated by a disaster, creates upheaval for actors. In France, Superphénix and 
Fessenheim are symbolic examples of the trauma caused by these policy decisions. 
The decision to decommission a nuclear facility has various impacts, not only on the 
plant’s employees and their families, but also on the economic and political 
environment of the site. Located in rural areas, nuclear power plants bring both jobs 
and boost revenue for local authorities who are able to finance the necessary 
infrastructure (schools, housing, sports facilities, etc.) and boost commercial facilities 
(Claes, 2001). The closure of the site also therefore has an impact on the environment 
surrounding the plant, which lowers the morale of its employees. While they may not 
necessarily lose their jobs (if they are employed by EDF or the CEA) they may be 
transferred geographically. Their mobility has a bearing on the economy of the region 
and also on well-established social networks.  
This unsettling period for both employees of the facility and its subcontractors is 
closely related to the societal debate on nuclear power.  
When the plant is operating, social networks and production pressures enable 
employees to create a strong professional identity for themselves and their families. 
This professional identity allows them to make sense of their actions and maintain 
morale.  
4.2 The effects of representations of the nuclear industry on the professional culture 
of decommissioning 
The professional culture of employees of nuclear power stations can only be 
understood with reference to the pioneering days of the operation of French nuclear 
power plants. It finds its origin in industrial reconstruction and a belief in the 
liberating power of atomic energy.  
In this sense, the construction and operation of the Phénix nuclear power plant in the 
1970s was seen as a human adventure. “They were working with passion, with bosses 
who knew how to run a team that brought together people from different 
backgrounds. It’s also the idea of working for the energetic future of humanity and 
this coherence between ethics and day-to-day work is a precious thing” (Sauvage, 
2009).  
The professional identity of the employees of nuclear facilities is therefore first and 
foremost based on a scientific culture and the belief that one is participating in a 
pioneering and innovative movement. The employees who are at the head of this 
movement have a particular status. They are guarantors of both production and the 
safety of the population. It is this strong professional identity that maintains their 
motivation for their work despite the efforts of the antinuclear movement to denounce 
the dangers and limitations of this method of production. This motivation increases 
their vigilance and attention to safety.  
It is quite different during decommissioning.  
Professional identity during decommissioning has yet to be created. In fact, 
decommissioning takes place over a long period of time and employees who are 
involved in the project are likely to be transferred or to retire. For the most part, they 
do not see the end of the project. The main problem lies in giving the work meaning. 
The feeling of transience and belonging to a profession that does not exist can lead to 
a loss of vigilance and a sense of collective action during operations where the 
consequences of making poor decisions are serious. Interviews that were carried out 
in a nuclear power plant that was being decommissioned demonstrated this 
asymmetry in professional identity between maintenance teams that had entered the 
decommissioning phase and who managed subcontractors, and team leaders who 
struggled to give “a sense of meaning” to the project.  
“So at the time, when it worked, the teams were given more to do than now and I 
would say that making a plant work to produce something is much more motivating 
than doing something, when we know that there’s nothing behind it (...) before we 
were producers, now we’re scrapyard operators. Operator in the true sense of the term 
means an operator that produces electricity. Today we’re pipe cutters” (a team leader).  
In this context, the public debate about the costs and risks of decommissioning can 
lower the morale of actors who seek meaning and a professional culture.  
Cultural change therefore requires a definition of the profession of decommissioning 
in order to create a new professional identity, which ensures that the same attention is 
paid to decommissioning activities as in operational phases. This identity must be 
consistent with the prevailing public debate. The myth of green decommissioning, a 
genuine profession that can guarantee the end of life for nuclear power plants in 
France and abroad, may help to create a new professional identity for both the 
facilities’ employees and subcontractors.  
5. CONCLUSION  
The public debate on nuclear power, whether global or limited to the situation in 
France, is framed in terms of risk and technological expertise. It is based on a 
symbolic dimension rooted in a belief system; the liberating power of technology on 
the one hand and impending disaster on the other. Decisions to withdraw from nuclear 
power find their origins in the history of the industry. These decisions are not neutral 
in terms of social impact. The destruction of the tool of their trade for personnel 
working in the nuclear industry has an impact on their experience of their work and 
how they maintain the collective morale that is necessary to ensure the safety of the 
plant. Under these conditions, it seems to be necessary to study, from a sociological 
and historical perspective, what it is that motivates employees and how they create 
their professional identity, before any reorganization for decommissioning. In this 
context, the Fessenheim power plant could provide a ground-breaking field of 
investigation for a new professional culture. 
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